
















Abstract:	 Cultural	 differences	 can	be	 a	 source	 of	 ambiguity	 in	 coordination	 games.	As	
players	 are	 likely	 to	 experience	more	 ambiguity	when	 playing	 a	 different	 culture,	we	
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	 Coordination	 is	 important	 for	many	economic	decisions,	such	as	 firms	deciding	
on	output	and	pricing	decisions	without	knowing	the	decisions	of	their	competitors,	or	
Governments	 setting	 trade	 policy	 without	 knowing	 the	 strategies	 of	 other	 countries.	
People	 from	 different	 backgrounds	 may	 use	 different	 heuristics	 when	 trying	 to	







when	 playing	 against	 someone	 from	 a	 different	 culture	 and	 therefore	 choose	 safer	
strategies	in	coordination	games.	
	 We	 ran	 two	 types	of	 coordination	games	–	a	 stag	hunt	 and	a	bargaining	game.	
While	 we	 did	 not	 find	 East	 Asian	 students	 to	 differentiate	 between	 a	 British	 or	 East	
Asian	opponent,	the	British	students	tended	to	act	very	differently	against	an	East	Asian	
opponent	 compared	 to	 a	 British	 opponent.	 In	 a	 stag	 hunt	 game,	 the	 British	 students	
played	 the	 safer	 strategy	 more	 often	 against	 an	 East	 Asian	 opponent,	 while	 in	 a	





One	possible	 reason	 for	our	 results	 could	be	 that	 the	British	were	basing	 their	
behaviour	on	a	cultural	stereotype	that	East	Asians	are	cautious.	However,	our	results	
show	 that	 this	 stereotype	 is	 misleading.	 This	 interpretation	 is	 in-line	 with	 previous	
research	 by	 Hsee	 and	 Weber	 (1999),	 who	 found	 that	 both	 Americans	 and	 Chinese	






2014)	 for	 coordination	 game	 outcomes.	 As	 culture	 is	 one	 aspect	 of	 identity,	 we	 can	
expect	 a	 group	 identity	 to	 be	 stronger	 when	 players	 are	 from	 the	 same	 cultural	
background.	 Chen	 and	 Chen	 (2011)	 show	 that	 a	 salient	 group	 identity	 increases	
coordination	 on	 Pareto	 superior	 outcomes	 in	 the	minimum	 effort	 coordination	 game	
(Huyck	et	al,	1990).	As	Chen	and	Chen	impose	only	minimal	group	identities	in	the	lab1,	
we	can	expect	natural	group	identities	such	as	culture	to	have	an	even	stronger	effect.		






















equilibrium	 is	where	 all	 players	 help	 in	 hunting	 a	 stag	 and	 obtain	maximum	payoffs.	
However,	there	is	also	a	risk	dominant	equilibrium,	where	each	player	guarantees	him	
or	 herself	 a	 sure	 payoff	 from	 hunting	 a	 hare.	 When	 there	 is	 uncertainty	 about	 the	
opponent’s	 action,	 such	as	under	ambiguity,	 a	 choice	of	hare	yields	a	higher	expected	
payoff	and	drives	players	towards	the	risk	dominant	equilibrium.	There	is	also	a	mixed	
strategy	equilibrium,	where	each	player	hunts	stag	with	a	2/3	probability.	
According	 to	Singh	(2012),	people	 from	societies	with	a	norm	of	high	 trust	are	
more	 likely	 to	 coordinate	 on	 the	 payoff	 dominant	 outcome	 in	 a	 stag	 hunt,	 whereas	
people	from	societies	with	a	norm	of	low	trust	will	be	driven	towards	the	risk	dominant	
equilibrium.	We	expect	ambiguity	to	work	in	a	similar	way	to	the	low	trust	norm.	Where	








social	 groups,	 even	when	 the	 characteristic	 is	not	 the	most	 common	within	 the	 social	
group.	 For	 example,	 most	 people	 in	 Florida	 are	 not	 elderly,	 but	 there	 are	 a	 greater	
proportion	 of	 elderly	 people	 in	 Florida	 compared	 to	 other	 states,	 giving	 rise	 to	 a	




do	 not	 necessarily	 represent	 the	 social	 norm2.	 For	 example,	 Fershtman	 and	 Gneezy	
(2001)	 find	 that	 men	 of	 Eastern	 Jewish	 origin	 (Asian	 or	 African)	 in	 Israel	 are	
discriminated	against	 in	a	trust	game	because	they	have	an	ethnic	stereotype	of	being	
untrustworthy.	However,	the	stereotype	was	found	to	be	unjustified	as	Eastern	Jewish	
participants	 did	 not	 send	 back	 significantly	 lower	 amounts	 than	men	 of	 European	 or	
American	 Jewish	 origin.	 They	 also	 find	 men	 of	 Eastern	 Jewish	 origin	 to	 be	 allocated	
more	money	in	an	ultimatum	game	because	they	have	a	stereotype	of	reacting	harshly	
to	unfairness.	Again,	this	stereotype	was	unfounded	in	actual	rejection	rates.	
	 Similarly,	 Hsee	 and	Weber	 (1999)	 find	 predictions	 of	 risk	 aversion	 in	 Chinese	
and	American	participants	to	be	in	contrast	to	actual	behaviour.	Participants	apparently	
rely	 on	 a	 misleading	 cultural	 stereotype	 that	 Americans	 are	 more	 risk	 seeking	 than	
Chinese,	probably	because	Americans	are	portrayed	as	risk	seeking	 in	movies.	 In	 fact,	
 
2	Stereotypes	are	often	correlated	with	social	norms,	as	people	gain	utility	from	belonging	to	a	group	and	









the	misleading	 stereotype	when	 trying	 to	 predict	 behaviour	 of	 those	 from	a	 different	
culture.	The	Chinese	participants	expected	Americans	to	be	even	more	risk	seeking	than	
the	American	participants	expected	of	each	other.	Similarly,	the	American	participants	
expected	 the	 Chinese	 to	 be	 even	 more	 cautious	 than	 the	 Chinese	 expected	 of	 other	
Chinese.	When	 trying	 to	 predict	 behaviour	 of	 people	 in	 other	 countries,	 participants	




	 Ambiguity	 refers	 to	 a	 situation	 where	 the	 relevant	 probabilities	 are	 unknown	
and	cannot	be	estimated	to	a	reasonable	degree.	Eichberger	et	al	(2008)	show	that	the	
identity	of	the	opponent	matters	for	ambiguity,	with	student	participants	experiencing	
more	 ambiguity	when	playing	 strategic	 games	 against	 a	 granny	 than	 a	 game	 theorist.	
Most	students	reported	that	the	game	theorist’s	behaviour	was	easier	to	guess	than	the	
granny	 and	 that	 they	 would	 prefer	 to	 play	 against	 the	 game	 theorist.	 As	 such,	 the	
students	 chose	 more	 ambiguity	 averse	 strategies	 against	 the	 granny	 than	 the	 game	
theorist.		As	people	are	less	familiar	with	the	social	norms	of	other	cultures,	we	expect	




	 A	 high	 degree	 of	 ambiguity	 can	 hinder	 coordination	 on	 the	 payoff	 dominant	
outcome	 in	 many	 coordination	 games.	 Eichberger	 and	 Kelsey	 (2002)	 consider	 a	
bargaining	game	where	players	can	make	claims	on	a	total	payoff,	say	4,	but	if	the	claims	
exceed	4,	everyone	receives	0.	As	the	players	are	not	allowed	to	communicate,	the	game	
can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 coordination	 game.	 Any	 outcome	 that	 exhausts	 the	 available	





	 	 3	 2	 1	
	 3	 0	,	0	 0	,	0	 3,	1	
Player	1	 2	 0	,	0	 2,	2	 2,	1	
	 1	 1,	3	 1,	2	 1,	1	
	
The	 bargaining	 game	 discussed	 above	 differs	 from	 the	 stag	 hunt	 in	 that	 the	
bargaining	game	is	a	situation	of	strategic	substitutes,	whereas	the	stag	hunt	is	a	game	
with	 strategic	 complements.	 Strategic	 substitutes	 are	 where	 an	 increase	 in	 the	
opponent’s	action	will	decrease	the	marginal	benefit	of	one’s	own	action.	For	example,	








games	 with	 strategic	 complements	 and	 substitutes.	 In	 the	 bargaining	 game	 we	 have	
strategic	 substitutes	 and	 negative	 aggregate	 externalities,	 because	 an	 increase	 in	
demands	 of	 the	 opponent	 lowers	 payoffs.	 In	 this	 case	 an	 increase	 in	 ambiguity	 will	
lower	equilibrium	actions.	Ambiguity	aversion	will	cause	a	given	player	to	overweight	
bad	 outcomes.	 With	 negative	 externalities,	 a	 bad	 outcome	 would	 be	 the	 opponent	
choosing	 a	 high	 strategy.	 With	 strategic	 substitutes	 this	 will	 reduce	 a	 given	 player’s	
perceived	marginal	benefit	of	 increasing	his/her	action.	 	 Since	both	players	 think	 this	
way	the	equilibrium	actions	will	be	lower	with	ambiguity.			
The	 opposite	 result	 holds	 under	 positive	 externalities.	 With	 strategic	
complements,	an	increase	in	ambiguity	will	increase	equilibrium	actions	under	negative	
externalities	 but	 decrease	 equilibrium	 actions	 under	 positive	 externalities.	 The	 stag	
hunt	game	has	positive	externalities,	 i.e.	a	higher	action	by	 the	opponent	 is	beneficial,	






local	 or	 a	 foreign	 opponent	 in	 coordination	 games	 with	 multiple	 equilibria.	 Their	








	 Kelsey	 and	 le	 Roux	 (2016)	 find	 no	 difference	 in	 the	 level	 of	 ambiguity	 when	
playing	 a	 local	 or	 foreign	 opponent.	 They	 offer	 the	 following	 reasons	 for	 this.	 Firstly,	
part	of	the	experiment	uses	a	within-subjects	design	where	players	face	both	a	local	and	
foreign	 opponent.	 Participants	may	 have	 simply	wanted	 to	 appear	 consistent	 in	 their	




	 However,	Kelsey	and	 le	Roux	 (2016)	also	point	out	 that	participants	may	have	
found	it	easy	to	conceptualise	the	foreign	students	and	thought	they	were	the	same	as	
any	 other	 students	 due	 to	 increasing	 globalisation.	 As	 universities	 in	 the	 UK	 have	
become	 very	 international,	 students	 are	 used	 to	 mingling	 with	 people	 from	 many	
different	cultures	and	probably	see	more	similarities	than	differences	with	their	fellow	
students.	This	point	is	difficult	to	control	for	and	can	only	be	dealt	with	by	extending	the	
sample	 to	 non-students	 who	 perhaps	 have	 less	 interaction	 with	 others	 from	 abroad.	
Such	an	extension	is	a	promising	avenue	for	future	work.	
3.	Experimental	Design	
We	 tested	 whether	 players	 from	 the	 same	 cultural	 background	 coordinated	
better	 when	 playing	 a	 stag	 hunt	 or	 a	 bargaining	 game.	 Players	 may	 view	 non-








We	 ran	 a	 between-subjects	 design	 where	 players	 faced	 either	 someone	 from	
their	own	culture	or	someone	from	a	different	culture,	but	not	both.	This	was	to	remove	
the	confound	of	participants	wanting	to	appear	consistent	against	different	opponents,	
as	noted	by	Kelsey	 and	 le	Roux	 (2016).	All	 participants	played	 either	 a	 one-shot	 stag	
hunt	game	or	a	one-shot	bargaining	game.	The	reason	we	chose	one-shot	games	was	to	
make	the	decisions	highly	salient	for	the	participants	and	avoid	wealth	effects	in	future	
rounds.	 We	 also	 wanted	 to	 avoid	 participants	 hedging	 risk	 between	 the	 two	 games,	
which	is	why	each	participant	only	played	either	the	stag	hunt	or	bargaining	game,	not	
both.	
We	 recruited	 East	 Asian	 and	 British	 students	 to	 the	 Finance	 and	 Economics	
Experimental	 Laboratory	 (FEELE)	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Exeter.	 Using	 ORSEE	 (Greiner,	
2004),	we	recruited	participants	based	on	surnames,	with	a	mixture	of	East	Asian	and	
English	 surnames	 invited	 to	 sessions.	We	 verified	 that	 all	 participants	 identified	with	
the	 appropriate	 cultures	 by	 checking	 their	 responses	 to	 a	 follow-up	 questionnaire.	 A	
small	 number	 of	 participants	 with	 English	 surnames	 came	 from	 other	 individualistic	
English-speaking	 countries	 such	 as	 Australia	 and	 the	 United	 States.	 All	 of	 the	
participants	 with	 East	 Asian	 surnames	 were	 in	 fact	 from	 East	 (or	 South	 East)	 Asian	
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have	 very	 different	 social	 norms	 and	 that	 they	 have	 obvious	 differences	 in	 physical	
appearance.	 To	 avoid	 experimenter	 demand	 effects4,	we	 used	 physical	 appearance	 to	




the	 countries	 we	 classed	 as	 either	 East	 Asian	 or	 British	 all	 rank	 very	 similarly	 on	 Hofstede’s	 cultural	
dimensions	(1980).	For	example,	on	individualism,	China,	Vietnam,	and	Thailand	all	score	20	while	Hong	
Kong	scores	25.	This	compares	to	the	UK’s	89,	Australia’s	90,	and	the	United	States’	91. 






instructions	 informed	 participants	 that	 they	 were	 randomly	 matched	 with	 another	
player	who	was	seated	on	the	other	side	of	the	room.	However,	to	preserve	anonymity	
we	did	not	reveal	who	on	the	other	side	of	the	room	they	were	matched	with.	
Given	 the	 large	 number	 of	 East	 Asian	 and	 British	 students	 studying	 at	 the	
university	and	small	capacity	of	the	lab	(16	participants),	we	did	not	believe	that	having	
only	East	Asian	or	British	students	 in	a	session	or	on	one	side	of	 the	room	would	 feel	
unusual	 for	 the	participants.	However,	we	 tested	 for	 experimenter	demand	effects	by	
asking	 participants	 what	 they	 thought	 the	 experiment	 was	 about	 in	 a	 follow-up	
questionnaire,	in	the	spirit	of	Benjamin	et	al	(2010).	 	
The	experiment	consisted	of	three	stages:	priming,	stag	hunt	game	or	bargaining	
game,	 and	 follow-up	questionnaire.	All	 of	 the	 stages	were	 run	on	 computer	 terminals	




	 Players	 were	 primed	 before	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 game,	 in	 order	 to	 make	 their	
cultural	 identities	 salient.	We	used	a	questionnaire	 to	 subtly	get	participants	 thinking	
about	 their	 own	 culture	 (Shih	 et	 al,	 1999).	 This	 type	 of	 priming	 avoids	 inducing	 any	








is	 dangerous	 as	 stereotypes	 can	 sometimes	 be	 misleading	 (Fershtman	 and	 Gneezy,	
2001;	 Hsee	 and	 Weber,	 1999).	 Instead,	 by	 completing	 a	 questionnaire,	 participants	
think	 about	 the	 people	 they	 know	 and	 social	 norms	 of	 their	 culture	 rather	 than	









	 Our	 simple	 2-player	 stag	 hunt	 game	 is	 illustrated	 in	 Table	 4.	 Players	 had	 two	
strategies	 to	 choose	 from,	which	we	 label	 as	 “1”	 and	 “2”.	We	 kept	 the	 labels	 neutral,	
rather	 than	 calling	 the	 strategies	 “hunt	 hare”	 or	 “hunt	 stag”.	 This	 is	 because	 the	














	 The	bargaining	game	 involved	a	 surplus	of	40	ECU	 to	be	 shared	between	each	
pair	 of	 participants.	 Each	 participant	 needed	 to	 decide	 how	 much	 of	 the	 40	 ECU	 to	








	 	 30	 25	 15	 10	
	 30	 0,	0	 0,	0	 0,	0	 30,	10	
Your	
Choice	
25	 0,	0	 0,	0	 25,	15	 25,	10	
15	 0,	0	 15,	25	 15,	15	 15,	10	




opponent	and	their	 total	payoff	 from	the	experiment.	After	payoffs	were	revealed,	 the	
experiment	 was	 concluded	 with	 a	 demographic	 questionnaire,	 to	 control	 for	 other	
factors	 that	 could	 be	 driving	 behaviour.	 The	 questionnaire	 included	 a	 few	 questions	
about	 cultural	 background	 to	 verify	where	 the	 participants	were	 born	 and	 raised.	 In	




no	 participants	 were	 from	 mixed	 cultures,	 by	 asking	 for	 the	 nationalities	 of	 both	
parents6.	 We	 also	 asked	 participants	 for	 their	 predictions	 about	 their	 opponent’s	




Table	 6	 shows	 some	 summary	 statistics	 of	 our	 sample.	 While	 age	 was	 quite	
similar	across	cultures,	the	East	Asian	sample	contained	a	higher	proportion	of	females	
than	 the	 British	 sample.	 The	 East	 Asian	 sample	 also	 contained	 a	 slightly	 higher	
proportion	of	business	majors.	On	average,	East	Asian	students	had	lived	in	the	UK	for	
3.30	years,	compared	to	an	average	of	17.43	for	the	British	students,	most	of	whom	had	











6	 According	 to	 our	 follow-up	 questionnaire,	 no	 participants	 were	 from	 mixed	 culture	 or	 immigrant	
families.	







7.	 As	 expected,	 participants	 in	 Treatment	 One	 (same	 culture)	 achieved	 more	
coordination	 on	 the	 payoff	 dominant	 outcome	 than	 participants	 in	 Treatment	 Two	
(different	 culture),	 with	 43%	 coordination	 compared	 to	 19%.	 This	 difference	 is	
significant	(p	=	0.022	using	a	one-sided	Z-test	for	equality	of	proportions8).	Participants	
in	 Treatment	 Two	 were	 slightly	 more	 likely	 to	 coordinate	 on	 the	 risk	 dominant	
outcome,	 but	 the	 difference	 is	 not	 significant.	 The	 difference	 in	 overall	 coordination	
levels	 between	 Treatment	 One	 and	 Treatment	 Two	 is	 also	 not	 significant.	 Average	
earnings	were	higher	in	Treatment	One	than	in	Treatment	Two,	but	the	difference	is	not	
quite	significant	(p	=	0.102	using	a	one-sided	t-test).	Overall,	these	results	support	our	

















30%	 20%	 50%	 £1.80	
Treatment	One:	
Same	Culture	


















to	go	 for	 the	payoff	dominant	outcome	 than	when	 faced	with	a	British	opponent	 (p	=	
0.081	using	a	one-sided	Fisher’s	exact	test).	However,	the	East	Asian	students	were	no	
less	likely	to	choose	the	payoff	dominant	outcome	when	faced	with	a	British	opponent	
compared	 to	 an	 East	 Asian	 opponent.	 In	 fact,	 the	 proportion	 of	 East	 Asians	 choosing	
each	option	was	exactly	the	same	in	each	treatment.	
We	also	checked	the	expectations	data	from	our	follow-up	questionnaire.	While	
the	 East	 Asian	 students	 did	 not	 differentiate	 between	 the	 same	 culture	 and	 mixed	
culture	treatments,	the	British	students	were	less	likely	to	expect	East	Asian	students	to	





































In	 order	 to	 control	 for	 demographic	 variables	 that	 may	 have	 influenced	 our	
results,	we	 ran	 a	 probit	 regression	 on	whether	 or	 not	 the	 participants	 chose	 to	 hunt	









10 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level of confidence 
is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
Coefficients 
Overall 
(n = 60) 
(Pseudo R2 = 
0.194)  
British 
(n = 28) 
(Pseudo R2 = 
0.175) 
East Asians 
(n = 32) 
(Pseudo R2 = 
0.186) 
East Asian 0.581 (0.932) 
N/A N/A 
Age     0.410** (0.177) 
0.235 
(0.168) 
   0.590** 
(0.284) 















East Asian Female -0.653  (0.903) 
N/A N/A 
Same Culture  0.601  (0.368) 












does	 not	 significantly	 influence	 the	 choice	 to	 hunt	 stag	 rather	 than	 hare.	 This	 is	 in	
contrast	 to	 the	 British	 student’s	 predictions	 that	 East	 Asians	 would	 be	 less	 likely	 to	
choose	 stag.	 This	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 cultural	 stereotype	 of	 East	 Asians	 being	
cautious	 is	misleading.	 In	 support	 of	 the	 non-parametric	 test,	 the	 binary	 variable	 for	
being	in	the	same	culture	treatment	is	positive	and	marginally	significant	for	the	British	
students.	










in	Table	9.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 stag	hunt,	participants	 in	Treatment	One	 (same	culture)	
coordinated	 better	 than	 participants	 in	 Treatment	 Two	 (different	 culture),	with	 63%	
coordination	compared	to	50%.	However,	this	difference	is	not	significant.	Participants	




sided	 Z-test	 for	 equality	 of	 proportions11).	 Choosing	 the	 riskier	 strategy	 of	 high	
















56%	 19%	 25%	 £3.03	
Treatment	One:	
Same	Culture	

































students	 expected	 East	 Asian	 students	 to	 claim	 less	 of	 the	 pie	 than	 other	 British	

























We	controlled	 for	 the	 following	variables:	 culture	 (East	Asian	=	1,	British	=	0),	 age	 in	
years,	gender	(female	=	1,	male	=	0),	subject	major	(business	major	=	1,	otherwise	=	0),	
years	 in	 the	 UK,	 an	 interaction	 term	 for	 culture	 and	 gender	 (East	 Asian	 female	 =	 1,	
otherwise	=	0),	and	treatment	(same	culture	=	1,	different	culture	=	0).	
The	 coefficients	 from	 this	 regression	 are	 presented	 in	 Table	 10.	 The	 results	
support	the	non-parametric	test,	with	a	significant	negative	effect	of	being	in	the	same	
culture	 treatment	 on	 bargaining	 game	 demands	 for	 the	 British	 students.	 None	 of	 the	




















East	 Asians	 to	 choose	 the	 safer	 options	 in	 both	 games,	 which	 would	 mean	 that	 the	
British	should	also	play	it	safe	in	the	stag	hunt	but	take	a	risk	in	the	bargaining	game.	
When	 looking	 at	 the	 expectations	 data,	 East	 Asian	 participants	 do	 not	 show	 much	
difference	between	treatments.	However,	the	British	expect	the	East	Asians	to	demand	
 




(n = 64) 
(R2 = 0.090) 
British 
(n = 32) 
(R2 = 0.247) 
East Asians 
(n = 32) 
(R2 = 0.150) 
East Asian -3.771  (3.242) 
N/A N/A 




















East Asian Female 2.150 (3.274) 
N/A N/A 
Same Culture -1.779  (1.437) 




Constant 25.637   (6.644) 
  9.755 
(19.750) 








that	 a	 stereotype	 of	 East	 Asians	 being	 cautious	 is	 not	 only	 misleading,	 but	 has	 real	
effects	on	behaviour.	Even	the	East	Asian	students	appear	to	be	affected	by	their	own	
stereotype	 in	 the	bargaining	 game,	where	 they	demand	 less	of	 the	pie	 against	British	
students	 than	 in	 the	 same	 culture	 treatment.	 East	 Asian	 students	 may	 lower	 their	






We	 can	 also	 consider	 whether	 playing	 someone	 from	 a	 different	 culture	
improves	or	hinders	 efficiency.	 For	both	games,	 the	payments	 are	higher	 in	 the	 same	
culture	 treatments	 than	 the	different	 culture	 treatments.	However,	 for	 the	bargaining	
game	 we	 notice	 fairly	 good	 coordination	 between	 East	 Asians	 and	 British	 in	 the	
different	culture	treatments.	British	increase	their	demands	when	facing	an	East	Asian	
opponent	 compared	 to	 another	 British	 opponent,	 while	 East	 Asians	 lower	 their	
demands	 against	 the	 British.	 The	 players	 seem	 to	 be	 using	 cultural	 stereotypes	 to	






the	 stag	 hunt	 game.	While	 East	 Asians	 tend	 to	 go	 for	 the	 payoff	 dominant	 outcome,	
British	expect	them	to	choose	the	opposite.	Therefore,	British	tend	to	choose	the	certain	





	 Another	possibility	 is	 that	participants	did	not	 consider	 the	cultural	 identity	of	
their	 opponent	 in	 decision	 making	 and	 treated	 the	 opponent	 simply	 as	 “another	
student”.	 In	 Eichberger	 et	 al’s	 (2008)	 experiment,	 the	 participants	 are	 given	





Three	 participants	 mentioned	 ethnicity	 or	 nationality	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	











UK	are	probably	more	used	 to	 interacting	with	British	people,	 than	 the	 local	 students	
are	 to	 interacting	with	East	Asians.	 There	 also	 appears	 to	 be	 some	misunderstanding	
about	 the	 identity	 question	 among	 East	 Asian	 participants.	 For	 example,	when	 asked	
what	 aspects	 of	 the	 opponent’s	 identity	 they	 considered,	 several	 students	mentioned	
mutual	benefit	or	what	choice	they	thought	the	opponent	would	take.		
	 We	also	need	to	consider	whether	our	priming	questionnaire	had	a	differential	
impact	 on	 British	 students	 compared	 to	 East	 Asian	 students.	 The	 questionnaire	









2.	 Sample	 bias.	 Although	we	 endeavoured	 to	make	 our	manipulation	 subtle	 to	 avoid	
experimenter	demand	effects,	 seating	participants	 from	different	cultures	on	different	
sides	 of	 the	 room	 may	 not	 have	 been	 salient	 enough	 to	 create	 a	 treatment	 effect.	
Although	 the	 manipulation	 appears	 to	 have	 worked	 for	 the	 British,	 the	 East	 Asian	
28 
 
students	 did	 not	 behave	 differently	 when	 faced	 with	 an	 opponent	 from	 a	 different	
culture.	East	Asian	students	may	have	not	picked	up	on	the	culture	of	 their	opponent,	
which	 is	 one	 explanation	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 a	 treatment	 effect.	 Sample	 bias	 comes	 from	






opponent	 from	a	different	 culture	 and	 therefore	 choose	 safer	 options	 in	 coordination	
games.	 This	 is	 because	 players	 may	 find	 it	 harder	 to	 predict	 each	 other’s	 behaviour	
when	 they	 do	 not	 share	 similar	 social	 norms.	 In	 our	 stag	 hunt	 game	 and	 bargaining	
coordination	games,	East	Asians	did	not	behave	 significantly	differently	when	 faced	a	
British	 or	 East	 Asian	 opponent.	 However,	 the	 British	 tended	 to	 go	 for	 the	 safe,	 risk	
dominant,	 outcome	 against	 the	 East	 Asians	 in	 the	 stag	 hunt,	 while	 increasing	 their	
demands	against	East	Asians	in	the	bargaining	game.	One	possible	reason	for	our	results	
could	be	that	the	British	were	basing	their	expectations	on	a	cultural	stereotype	of	East	







































































As	 another	 example,	 if	 you	 choose	 10	 and	 the	 other	 player	 chooses	 15,	 the	 total	






	 	 30	 25	 15	 10	
	 30	 0,	0	 0,	0	 0,	0	 30,	10	
Your	
Choice	
25	 0,	0	 0,	0	 25,	15	 25,	10	
15	 0,	0	 15,	25	 15,	15	 15,	10	




























Benjamin,	 D.	 J.,	 Choi,	 J.	 J.,	 &	 Strickland,	 A.	 J.	 (2010).	 Social	 Identity	 and	 Preferences.	
American	Economic	Review,	100:4,	1913-1928.	
Berninghaus,	S.	K.,	Haller,	S.,	Kruger,	T.,	Neumann,	T.,	Schosser,	S.,	&	Vogt,	B.	(2013).	Risk	
attitude,	 beliefs,	 and	 information	 in	 a	 Corruption	 Game	 –	 An	 experimental	
analysis.	Journal	of	Economic	Psychology,	34,	46-60.	
Bordalo,	 P.,	 Coffman,	 K.,	 Gennaioli,	 N.,	 &	 Shleifer,	 A.	 (2016).	 Stereotypes.	 Quarterly	
Journal	of	Economics,	131:4,	1753-1794.	
Brislin,	 R.	 W.,	 &	 Lonner,	 W.	 J.	 (1973).	 Cross-Cultural	 Research	 Methods.	 New	 York,	
London:	Wiley-Interscience.	
Chen,	R.,	&	Chen,	Y.	 (2011).	The	Potential	 of	 Social	 Identity	 for	Equilibrium	Selection.	
American	Economic	Review,	101:6,	2562-2589.	
Chen,	 Y.,	 Li,	 S.	 X.,	 Liu,	 T.	 X.,	&	 Shih,	M.	 (2014).	Which	Hat	 to	Wear?	 Impact	 of	Natural	
Identities	on	Coordination	and	Cooperation.	Games	and	Economic	Behavior,	 84,	
58-86.	
Dohmen,	 T.,	 Falk,	 A.,	 Huffman,	 D.,	 Sunde,	 U.,	 Schupp,	 J.,	 &	 Wagner,	 G.	 G.	 (2011).	








Eichberger,	 J.,	 Kelsey,	 D.,	 &	 Schipper,	 B.	 (2008).	 Granny	 Versus	 Game	 Theorist:	
Ambiguity	in	Experimental	Games.	Theory	and	Decision,	64:2,	333-362.	




Geisinger,	 A.	 (2004).	 A	 Group	 Identity	 Theory	 of	 Social	 Norms	 and	 Its	 Implications.	
Tulane	Law	Review,	78:605,	605-652.	









Huyck,	 J.	 B.,	 Battalio,	 R.	 C.,	 &	 Beil,	 R.	 O.	 (1990).	 Tacit	 Coordination	 Games,	 Strategic	
Uncertainty,	 and	 Coordination	 Failure.	 The	 American	 Economic	 Review,	 80:1,	
234-248.	
Kahheman,	 D.,	 &	 Tversky,	 A.	 (1972).	 Subjective	 Probability:	 A	 Judgement	 of	
Representativeness.	Cognitive	Psychology,	3:3,	430-454.	
Kelsey,	 D.,	 &	 le	 Roux,	 S.	 (2016).	 Dragon	 Slaying	 with	 Ambiguity:	 Theory	 and	
Experiments,	Journal	of	Public	Economic	Theory,	19:1,	178-197.	
Neumann,	 T.,	 &	 Vogt,	 B.	 (2009).	 Do	 Players’	 Beliefs	 or	 Risk	 Attitudes	 Determine	 The	
Equilibrium	 Selections	 in	 2x2	 Coordination	 Games?	 Working	 Paper.	 Otto	 von	
Guericke	University	Magdeburg.	
Shih,	 M.,	 Pittinsky,	 T.	 L.,	 &	 Ambady,	 N.	 (1999).	 Stereotype	 Susceptibility:	 Identity	
Salience	and	Shifts	in	Quantitative	Performance.	Psychological	Science,	10:1,	80-
83.	
Singh,	 T.	 B.	 (2012).	 A	 social	 interactions	 perspective	 on	 trust	 and	 its	 determinants,	
Journal	of	Trust	Research,	2:2,	107-135.	
	
